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Bank Runs – Suspension of Convertibility and Deposit Insurance 
 
Abstract 
 
From the very beginning, the banking system has been vulnerable to bank runs. A bank 
run occurs when a large number of depositors attempt to withdraw their funds 
simultaneously because they are afraid that the bank will not be able to repay the deposits 
in full and on time.  
The view that financial crises are costly may be based primarily on the Wall Street crash 
of the early 1930s. This was one of the most extreme crises which had significant impact 
on the banking system of the United States. History does not end and the long lines 
outside Northern Rock branches in Britain, on September 2007, as well as the bankruptcy 
of Lemman Brother Holdings Inc., in 2008, brought back memories from the worldwide 
monetary history. The financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 is reminiscent of a bank run and it 
seems obvious that research on bank runs and financial instability has taken on a new 
urgency. 
The model presented in this master thesis is consistent both with the sunspots and business 
cycle view of the origins of banking panics. The main motivation of this work is to 
compare, from a welfare point of view, two different banking regulations that try to avoid 
or mitigate the effects of bank runs - suspension of convertibility and government 
deposit insurance. With the first mechanism, payments are suspended at a certain level 
and with the second, deposits are always guaranteed when the bank fails.  
We show that if the level of risk aversion is high enough, suspension 
of convertibility dominates deposit insurance, however we also show, numerically, that 
the relation is not monotone for low values of risk aversion. 
 
Keywords: bank runs, deposit contracts, optimal risk sharing, deposit insurance, 
suspension of convertibility. 
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Corridas e Pânicos Bancários – Suspensão de Convertibilidade e Depósito de Seguro 
 
Resumo 
 
Desde o seu início que o sistema financeiro enfrenta o problema de corridas e pânicos 
bancários. Diz-se que há uma corrida aos bancos quando, simultaneamente, um número 
elevado de indivíduos tenta retirar os seus depósitos do banco, devido ao receio de que 
este não seja capaz de cumprir os seus compromissos de liquidez. 
As crises financeiras são, em geral, caracterizadas por períodos de grande instabilidade e 
acarretam graves custos para a sociedade. Um exemplo presente na memória de todos nós 
é o da Grande Depressão dos anos 30 que teve lugar nos Estados Unidos da América. 
Recentemente, as longas filas à entrada do banco britânico Northern Rock em Setembro 
de 2007, assim como, a falência do banco de investimento Lemman Brother Holdings 
Inc., em 2008, desencadearam uma nova vaga de falências bancárias. 
O modelo presente nesta tese de mestrado considera que corridas e pânicos bancários 
ocorrem devido a variáveis não correlacionadas com fundamentos económicos, como por 
exemplo sunspots, e devido a informação existente na economia sobre o retorno futuro dos 
activos bancários. Este estudo pretende avaliar, do ponto de vista do 
bem-estar, dois contractos que atenuam e previnem os efeitos de corridas e pânicos 
bancários – suspensão de convertibilidade e seguros de depósitos. 
No quadro do nosso modelo demonstramos que quando o nível de aversão ao risco é 
elevado, a suspensão de convertibilidade é preferível ao seguro de depósito. No entanto, 
demonstramos também que para níveis de aversão ao risco suficientemente baixos, esta 
relação não é monótona. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: corridas e pánicos bancários, contratos de depósito, partilha de risco, 
depósito de seguro, suspensão de convertibilidade.  
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1 Introduction
A run on Britains Northern Rock in September 2007 was one of the most sudden and shocking
events of the nancial crisis. It was the rst run on a British bank for more than 100 years. in
Hu¤post Business1
From the earliest times the banking system has been vulnerable to the problem of bank runs.
A large number of depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because they are
afraid that the bank will not be able to repay the deposits in full and on time. To avoid a run,
the bank must quickly increase its cash in order to meet the depositorsdemand. However it
keeps only a fraction of deposits on hand in cash, the majority are used to lend out to borrowers
or to purchase interest-bearing assets. If the withdrawals at a particular bank then spread across
banks in the same region or country, they may generate a nancial crises. Prior to the twentieth
century, banking panics occurred frequently in Europe and the United States.
Bank runs are widely viewed as a bad thing and most of times is a common feature of extreme
crises and developments in nancial regulation and monetary policy have been motivated by
fears of banking panics. The creation of central banks also aimed at eliminating runs and ensure
nancial stability.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Bank of England developed e¤ective stabiliza-
tion policies and by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in
Europe. In the United States, during 1865 and 1914, banking crises occurred repeatedly, which
led to the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 Gorton (1988).
The nancial crisis associated with the Wall Street crash of the early 1930s was one of the
most extreme crises, which had a signicant impact on the banking system of the United States.
In 1929 more than 600 banks failed and the last wave of bank runs continued through the winter
of 1932.2 As it was noted by Allen and Gale (1998), after its creation, the Federal Reserve
System was not very e¤ective in eliminating banking panics. After the crisis of 1930, it was given
broader powers and this together with the introduction of deposit insurance led to the elimination
of periodic banking crises. Until recently bank runs appeared to be a thing of the past in Europe
and the United States (although several emerging countries still had severe problems in their
banking systems).3
Between 1980 and 1996, Lindgren et al. (1996) found that more than seventy percent of the
International Monetary Funds member countries su¤ered some form of banking crises. History
does not end and the long lines outside Northern Rock branches in Britain, on September 2007,
as well as the bankruptcy of Lemman Brother Holdings Inc., in 2008, brought back old memo-
ries from the worldwide monetary history. In Portugal, the liquidity problems faced by Banco
1http://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com
2See Mishkin (1995).
3Schumacher (2000) studies a bank panic that was triggered in Argentina by the Mexican devaluation of 1994.
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Português de Negócios (BPN) led to its nationalization in November 2008, becoming it the rst
private bank to be nationalized by the Portuguese government since 1975.
The nancial crisis of 2007 and 2008 is reminiscent of a bank run. Much has been written
about their possible causes and the magnitude of the economic disruptions that accompany them.
It seems obvious that research on bank runs and nancial instability has taken on a new urgency.
The banking panics literature has focused on understanding the economic role of banks in the
nancial system and their vulnerability to runs. In modern theories of nancial intermediation,
banks are valuable as providers of liquidity services. They can improve on a competitive market
by issuing demand deposits contracts, which allow for better risk sharing among depositors who
face idiosyncratic shocks in their consumption needs.
Two leading theories emerged to explain the origins and causes of bank runs: self-fullling
prophecies and information-based bank runs. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrated that
demand deposit contracts, which convert highly illiquid assets into liquid deposits, provide a
rationale both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs. In their model, a
panic is the realization of a bad equilibrium due to the fulllment of depositorsself-expectations
concerning the behavior of other depositors. An alternative to this view is the pioneering study
of Bryant (1980) which assert that bank runs occur due to the di¤usion of negative information
about banks solvency. If depositors receive information about an impending downturn in the
cycle, they anticipate that the bank assets will be lower and may try to withdraw their deposits.
Panics are no longer a response to an extrinsic random variable but a response to unfolding
economic circumstances.
The importance of distinguishing between these two approaches is that each has di¤erent pol-
icy implications. If depositorsbehavior is based on random variables not related with economic
fundamentals, such as sunspots, the bank much provide enough liquidity. On the other hand,
if depositorsexpectations are formed based on macroeconomic information, the bank must be
concerned about depositorsability to correctly understand this information. In fact, Ennis and
Keister (2009) noted that during a banking crises the behavior of individuals depends crucially
on how they expect the authorities to respond to events.
Given the nancial meltdown of the recent years, there is a fair amount of empirical evidence
on the e¤ects of banking crises, however we took a di¤erent route, in this sense, we decided to
take the challenge of developing theoretical work on this subject.
The model presented in this master thesis is consistent both with the sunspots and business
cycle view of the origins of banking panics. As standard in the literature, preferences over
consumption schemes are random, information about agents type is private and banks behave
competitively. It is assumed the existence of a continuum of ex ante identical agents of measure
one who observe a macroeconomic indicator, which gives them information about the outcome
in the last period.4 The main motivation of this work is to compare, from a welfare point of
4Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Allen and Gale (1998) assumed that a fractio of the depositors observe
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view, two di¤erent banking regulations that try to avoid or mitigate the e¤ects of bank runs -
suspension of convertibility and government deposit insurance.
A suspension of convertibility is the most common policy response to a banking panic. When-
ever runs occur the bank can suspend payments at the level of the highest proportion of depos-
itors. Brazil (1990), Ecuador (1999) and Argentina (2001) declared widespread suspension of
payments to stop the outow of deposits from the banking system.5 Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) showed that this policy should rule out the bank run equilibrium. However, Ennis and
Keister (2009) argued that the suspension of payments observed in reality typically di¤er in at
least two important ways from the one studied by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). First, the sus-
pension is usually declared relatively late in the course of the overall crisis and second deposits
are often not completely suspended, some types of withdrawals may still be allowed.6
The deposit insurance system always guarantees depositors their promised payment. This
implies that whenever the bank fails, it receives a transfer from the regulatory agent (government)
to pay out individuals. Freixas and Gabillon (1999) said that deposit insurance has social benets
as well as costs for taxpayers. Samartín (2002) noted that when asset returns are low, other
sectors have to be taxed to make up the shortfall.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In chapters 2 and 3, we present the most
relevant banking panics literature under the two leading views of the origins and causes of bank
runs: self-fullling prophecies and information-based, respectively. In chapter 4 we describe our
model, the welfare analysis and the numerical simulations; while chapter 5 wraps up this master
thesis with the main conclusions and future work to be done.
a signal, which can be thought of as a leading economic indicator. This signal predicts with perfect accurancy
the value of the return that will be realized in the last period. In our model the information provided by the
macroeconomic indicator is imperfect and observed by everybody..
5See International Monetary Fund (2002).
6Wallace (1990) showed that it is optimal to an economy to have partial suspensions instead of a total sus-
pension of payments.
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2 Bank runs as self-fullling prophecies
In November 2010, rumours swirled through nancial markets that Spanish bank BBVA was
su¤ering a run on its deposits. The share price fell before excitable traders realised they had
made a mistake. In fact the bank was holding a fun run in Madrid and customers had lined
up outside its branches to get their t-shirts. in Hu¤post Business7
Bank runs and nancial panics are often thought to be self-fullling phenomena. In that
case, individuals withdraw their funds in anticipation of a crisis, however it is their actions that
generate the crisis itself. A substantial literature arised asking whether or not, and under what
circumstances, a self-fullling bank run can be the outcome of an economic model with optimizing
agents and rational expectations.
The classic work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) highlights insurance gains by showing that
banks provide liquidity to depositors who are ex ante uncertain about their preferences over
consumption schemes. The demand deposit contracts support a pareto-optimal allocation of the
risk by allowing depositors to make early withdrawals when they need the most. Nevertheless, a
second and ine¢ cient equilibrium exists in which depositors panic and withdraw their deposits
immediately. Demand deposit contracts provide liquidity but leave banks vulnerable to runs.
A bank run is a consequence of the existence of multiple equilibria. With a rst-come and
rst-served rule, which implies that the return received by each depositor may depend on their
position in line, if all depositors believe that a banking panic is about to occur, it is optimal for
them to try to withdraw their funds before the bank goes bankrupt. Depositors who withdraw
initially will receive more than those who wait to withdraw. On the other hand, if no one believes
that a bank run may occur, only those with immediate needs for liquidity will withdraw deposits
from the bank. The others prefer to wait and receive the corresponding interest. Each of these
two equilibria may depend on the realization of an extrinsic random variable, which is not directly
related with economic fundamentals of the economy, often called sunspots.8
The rst-come and rst-served assumption has been the subject of some debate in the lit-
erature as it is not an optimal arrangement in the basic Diamond and Dybvigs (1983) model.
Wallace (1988) argued that the authors ignored important constraints and, for that reason, he
developed a model with two new assumptions that are at best implicit in the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) sequential nature of information ows. Based on his early work, Wallace (1990)
studied the aggregate risk version of the model. In fact, the author believed that a model under
this specication might better account for the illiquid di¢ culties faced by banks.
Green-Lin (2003) and Peck-Shell (2003) study the optimal allocation in almost identical ver-
sions of Diamond and Dybvigs (1983) model. However, they di¤er about the agents information
set at the time of early withdrawals. Green and Lin (2003) considered that agents have in-
7http://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com
8To better understand this notion see Cass and Shell (1983).
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formation about the order in which they will have an opportunity to withdraw. Under this
specication, they were able to solve the banks problem by using a backward induction argu-
ment. In contrast, Peck and Shell (2003) stated that consumers are not informed about their
relative position in the sequence of the bank service. People decide whether or not to withdraw
their deposits before knowing the order in which they will contact the bank.
This chapter is divided in ve subsections: rst we present a theoretical example which
highlights the potential for join action and, after that, the work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983);
then, we briey describe the model of Wallace (1988, 1990) and Green-Lin (2003); and, nally,
we develop with some detail the Peck-Shells (2003) model by computing one of their examples.
We end this chapter with the main conclusions.
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2.1 Joint actions
Based on the camping trip economy ofWallace (1988), we will present a theoretical example which
highlights the gains from joint action which will be the models analogue of intermediation.
Consider that a group of people, N in number, has available y units of food, in which they can
eat as a morning snack or a snack after lunch. Each unit will grow if stored, thus will become R1
units if held until the morning break and R1R2 if it is sustained after lunch. Acting alone, each
person can look forward to a morning snack of R1y or a snack after lunch of R1R2y: Therefore,
the autarky allocations are given by (
c11 = R1y
c22 = R1R2y
(1)
where the subscript denotes the time of the meal - 1 for morning and 2 for afternoon - and the
superscript represents the persons state during the morning - 1 for hungry and 2 for not hungry.
Given that the probability of being hungry during the morning is 1; the total amount
consumed in the morning is C1 = 1NR1y: Since C2 is the total amount consumed after lunch,
the maximum C2 consistent with a given C1 is C2 = R2(NR1y   C1): Therefore, the autarky
aggregate allocations are given by (
C1 = 1NR1y
C2 = R2(NR1y   C1)
(2)
The di¤erence in parentheses is what is left to accumulate at the rate R2 after all morning
snacks, C1; have been subtracted.
Now, consider the non-autarkic solution. Assume that the group can somehow arrange to
have C1 divided equally among the fraction of people who are hungry, 1N; and to have C2
divided equally among the (1  1)N; i.e. people who are not hungry in the morning. Then(
c11 =
C1
1N
c22 =
C2
(1 1)N
Substituting the implied expressions for C1 and C2 into equation (2) implies that the maximum
c22 consistent with a given c
1
1 is
c22 =
R2(R1y   1c11)
1  1 (3)
In the beginning of the day, individuals care about both c11 and c
2
2 because they do not know
whether they will be hungry during the morning. If they are able to rank all combinations of c11
and c22, in particular all those that satisfy equation (3) ; there is no reason to suppose that the
autarkic combination (system 1) is the most preferred. Basically if people pool their resources
in the beginning of the day, they are able to expand their consumption choices set.
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2.2 Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
There is a single homogeneous good, a single bank in the economy and a continuum of consumers
of measure one. The ex ante identical consumers and the bank are the only agents. The model
considers that people need to consume at di¤erent random times and the bank seeks to maximize
the ex ante expected utility of consumers.
There are two frictions in the model. First, agents are uncertain about their types impatient
or patient which are private information. This implies that contracts cannot be made contingent
on depositorstype. Second, the sequential service constraint, which requires that withdrawal
tenders are served sequentially in random order when they arrive at the bank.
The time is divided in three periods, t = 0; 1; 2. In period 0, each consumer receives an
endowment of one unit of good and then, in the same period, they will invest it in productive
technology, which has constant returns to scale. The technology yields R > 1 units of output in
period 2 for each unit of input in period 0. The long term capital investment is irreversible and
if in period 1 the technology is interrupted, the salvage value is just the initial investment. The
productive technology is represented by the following blueprint
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
0 R
 1
1 0
In period 0 all consumers are identical and each faces a privately observed risk of being type
1 or type 2. Type 1 agents value only date 1 consumption and type 2 agents care about the
sum of consumption in both periods 1 and 2. The probability of a consumer being impatient is
 2 (0; 1) and in period 1 each agent learns her own type. By the law of large numbers when
N ! 1 the sample average converges to the expected value. Thus, the fraction of impatient
individuals among the total population is also given by :9
Each consumer has a state-dependent utility function given by
U(c1; c2) =
(
u(c1) if type 1
u(c1 + c2) if type 2
where 1   > R 1 and u : R+ ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, strictly
concave and satises Inada conditions: u0(0) = 1 and u0(1) = 0: The relative risk-aversion
coe¢ cient is   cu00(c)
u0(c) > 1; everywhere.
Without a banking system the optimal solution is easy to nd. Letting cit be consumption in
period t of an agent who is of type i; the agents choose c11 = 1; c
1
2 = c
2
1 = 0 and c
2
2 = R; since
9Remember that the model is assuming a continuum of agents.
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type 1s always interrupts production in period 1 and type 2s always waits until period 2.
To nd the optimal allocation, let us assume that there is a bank and types are publicly
observable. The optimal contract o¤ered by the bank, which gives the ex ante optimal sharing
among type 1 and type 2 agents contingent on depositorstype, it will be
c2

1 = c
1
2 = 0 (4)
u0(c1

1 ) = Ru
0(c2

2 ) (5)
c1

1 +

(1  )c22
R

= 1 (6)
Since R > 1 and   cu00(c)
u0(c) > 1 these equations require that c
1
1 > 1, c
2
2 < R and c
2
2 > c
1
1 : In
this contract there is risk sharing and agents are partially insured against the outcome of being
a type 1 agent.10
Can the optimum be achieved with a contract that satises the sequential service
constraint?
The sequential service constraint implies that the banks payo¤ to any agent can depend
only on an agents place in line at the time of withdrawal. Consider a contract that guarantees
a xed claim of r1 unit deposited in period 0 to all agents who need to cash some part of their
deposits in period 1. The period 1 payo¤, V1; and the period 2 payo¤, V2; can be written as
V1(fj; r1) =
(
r1 if fj < r 1
0 if fj  r 1
(7)
and
V2(f; r1) = max

R(1  r1f)
(1  f) ; 0

(8)
where fj is the fraction of deposit withdrawals serviced before agent j and f represents the total
fraction of demand deposits withdrawn in period 1. Note that if fj  r 1 the bank has run
out of funds. If r1 = c1

1 the demand deposit contract achieves the full-information optimal risk
sharing as an equilibrium. This contract is called the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium or the
pure demand deposit contract and it requires that type 1 agent will withdraw at t = 1 and type
2 agent will wait until t = 2: Because r1 > 1; the liquidation value of banks assets is less than
the face value of deposits. Therefore, if agents anticipate that the other agents are trying to
withdraw their deposits, all consumers will prefer to withdraw at t = 1, meaning that runs are
also an equilibrium.
After a bank run, allocations are worse than those which would be obtained without bank.
10The optimal contract satises the self-selection constraints, which states that no agent envies the treatment
by the market of other indistinguishable agents.
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Despite that, the authors pointed out that even when the depositor anticipates that a banking
panic may occur, she will deposit at least some part of her wealth in the bank, as long as she
believes that the probability of a run is su¢ ciently small. However, the bank must be concerned
about the fragility which characterizes the pure demand deposit contract. If condence with its
customers is not maintained, a bank run can take place at some instance of time, since it depends
extrinsic uncertainty.
In order to defend the banking system against runs the authors suggested a modication
of the demand deposit contract, which is dened as suspension of convertibility. Assuming
the sequential service constraint, this contract allows the bank to suspend convertibility after
a fraction f^ < r 11 of all deposits have been withdraw. In that case, agents who claim to be
impatient will receive nothing at t = 1 if their position in line is above of f^ : If agents predict this
situation, the run can be removed and type 2 agents will not have the incentive to make early
withdrawals. In this case, the period 1 payo¤, V1; and the period 2 payo¤, V2; are given by
V1(fj; r1) =
(
r1 if fj  f^
0 if fj > f^
(9)
and
V2(f; r1) = max
(
R(1  r1f)
(1  f) ;
R(1  r1f^)
(1  f^)
)
(10)
with (1  r1f^) > 0: The suspension of convertibility occurs when fj = f^ :As long as
R(1  r1f^)
(1  f^)  r1
bank runs are ruled out.
Letting r1 = c1

1 and
f^ 2

;

(R  r1)
r1(R  1)

type 2 agents will not withdraw at t = 1 because they receive higher returns by waiting until
t = 2; no matter what others do. On the other hand, type 1 agents will withdraw everything in
period 1 because it is worthless for them to withdraw in period 2. Therefore, there is an unique
Nash equilibrium which has f =  where for all f and fj  f
V2(:) > V1(:)
Since type 2 agents have no incentive to early withdrawals, the suspension of convertibility
at f^ ensures that it will never be protable to participate in a bank run. Note, however, that
this contract works perfectly only because the number of withdrawals, ; is known, meaning that
there is no aggregate risk.
9
2.3 The sequential service constraint
Based on the work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Wallace (1988) presented a model with a
nite number of consumers. Moreover, the author considered two new assumptions that are,
from his point of view, implicit in their sequential nature of information ows.
At t = 1 people are isolated from each other but each contacts a central location at a random
time and at random order during that period. The isolation in period 1 is needed for the existence
of intermediation in the version of the model when each individuals type is known. If people were
not isolated they would have access to a credit market, which is inconsistent with the voluntary
participation in an illiquid banking arrangement. The model also denes a machine, located
at central location, in which people can deposit their good. This machine is programmed in
period 0 and is not able to determine the individuals type. In period 1 all withdrawals are made
and each consumer contacts this machineonce at a random time.
In the version without aggregate risk, Wallace (1988) concluded the same as Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). In fact, their model works well and suspension of convertibility provides a good
equilibrium. After the interruption of payments, everything which was left will be divided among
those who did not attempt to withdraw in period 1.
In a variant of his earlier work, Wallace (1990) argued that the arrangement that is obtained
from an environment without aggregate risk does not resemble the banking system suspensions
that are observed in the economy. For that reason, the author believes that a model with
aggregate risk might better account for the illiquid di¢ culties faced by banks. In this version
the fraction of people who will turn out to be impatient is unknown in t = 0.
Wallace (1990) divided people among two fractions with respect to the moment in which they
encountered the bank: a fraction of people  encounter the bank rst and a fraction of people
(1  ) encounter the bank last. Among fraction  exactly { are impatient and (1  {) are
patient agents. In the fraction (1  ) there are two possibilities: with probability q all of these
people are impatient and with probability (1  q) all are patient agents. The total number of
people who will turn out to be impatient can be(
{ + (1  ) with probability q
{ with probability 1  q
where (1  ) is assumed to be positive but near zero.
The model states that the aggregate randomness arises from the group who show up last.
Therefore, the bank learns the aggregate state, i.e. whether the total number of impatient is
{ + (1  ) or { from the response of everyone encountered in the fraction (1  ) :
In a general way, we may dene the notation for consumption pairs used by Wallace (1990)
as
cijt ()
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where cijt is the consumption in period t of an agent who is of type i and the second superscript,
j; denotes the moment in which the individual encounters the bank - 1 for the rst  and 2
for the last (1  ) - while, ; within parentheses represents the aggregate state, i.e. those who
encounter the bank are all impatient, labeled 1, or patient, state 2.
In period 0 the bank announces that all resources will be invested in technology and in the
next period, as people are encountered, they will be asked their type. Those who claim to be
type 1 agents will receive c111 until a total of
N{c111
where N is the amount of people considered by the model. Since the bank is unable to determine
the aggregate state in the fraction ; c111 will be independent of it.
At that point partial suspension will go into e¤ect. People who claim to be impatient after
N{c111 will receive c121 (1); which represents the consumption given to people among the last
fraction (1  ) in the aggregate state 1. The bank will continue to distribute the resources to
those who claim to be impatient until total disbursements reach
N{c111 +N(1  )c121 (1) (11)
which represents a total suspension. Those who say they are type 2 will be told that they will
divide equally at period 2 what is left after the period 1 withdrawals are made.
If the number of impatient consumers is su¢ ciently large the best arrangement will display
some aspects of partial suspension, which is intuitively related with notion that who show up
late ends up worse o¤ than those who show up early. The model provided by Wallace (1990)
states that is desirable for an economy to have occasional partial suspensions, instead of bank
suspensions and this is enough to prevent bank runs.
More recently, Green-Lin (2003) developed a version of the Diamond-Dybvigs (1983) model
with a nite number of agents, independent determination of each agents type and sequential
service. In their model the constrained-e¢ cient allocation does not permit a bank run equilibria.
They considered a nite set of consumers, N; and two time periods, t = 0; 1, where period 0
represents the beginning of life. Each individual is uncertain about the realization of their type:
with probability p becomes a patient agent and with probability (1  p) an impatient agent. In
period 0 consumers learn their own type and during that period they contact the bank at random
order. Moreover, they also observe their own arrival, as well as their position in line.
When consumers arrive at the bank they report a message and because of that resources are
distributed based on the message that the bank receives. It is, however, important to distinguish
consumption given to impatient and patient agents. In the rst case, consumption will depend
on information that has already been reported to the bank. In the second, it will be determined
on the basis of all tradersmessage. This is the way how Green and Lin (2003) formalized their
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sequential service constraint.
Since each individual observes the clock timeof her own arrival, i.e. her position in line,
Green and Lin (2003) were able to solve the banks problem by using a backward induction
argument. Agents who arrive very late can be almost certain that they are in the end of the
queue and they will always reveal their true types. The others will strictly prefer to tell their
true types, because they anticipate that the last agent will do the same. The optimal contract
implies that truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each individual.
Wallace (1988, 1990) and Green-Lin (2003) ruled out the existence of bank runs. However
Peck-Shell (2003) brought back the possibility of panics into the bank run literature. They
used examples with active constraints under the assumption that depositors are not informed
about their position in the sequence of bank service. Their model will be presented in the next
subsection but for now, in order to understand the di¤erent implications present in the models, we
will briey described the main di¤erences in the assumptions of Peck-Shell (2003) and Green-Lin
(2003).
Peck-Shell (2003) allow the utility function to di¤er across types, i.e. the utility function of
period 1 consumption for the impatient agent is not the same as the utility function of period
2 consumption for patient agent, in particular they allow the marginal utility to be higher for
impatient agents. In this case, the incentive compatibility, which implies that patient consumer
weakly prefer to choose period 2 consumption instead of period 1 consumption, may be a binding
constraint at the optimum. Green-Lin (2003) assume that both types share the same form of
utility function.
Other di¤erence is the clock time. The model developed by Green-Lin (2003) states that
when agent arrives at the bank she knows her place in line. Without this assumption it would
not be possible to them solve the banks problem by using the backward induction argument.
Green-Lin (2003) considered two periods and the direct revelation mechanism. They assumed
that all consumers, sequentially, contact the bank in period 1 and report their types, indepen-
dently if they are patient or impatient agents. In this sense, the period 1 consumption of agents
who report to be impatient is based on information provided by the agents who have already
contacted the bank, even when the consumption period for some of those is just in period 2.
Peck-Shell (2003), instead, dened three time periods and the indirect mechanism, i.e. the mere
arrival at the queue is a report of impatience.
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2.4 Peck and Shell (2003)
There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2 and a nite number of consumers, N: In period 0 each
consumer is endowed with y units of consumption good. The productive technology is described
as follows
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
0 R
 1
1 0
where investing one unit of period 0 consumption yields R > 1 units in period 2 and yields one
unit if harvested in period 1. An agents type, impatient or patient, is private information. Let
c1 denote period 1 consumption and c2 denote period 2 consumption, the utility functions of the
respective types are given by (
u(c1) if impatient
v(c1 + c2) if patient
The model assumes that u(:) and v(:) are strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continu-
ously di¤erentiable. The coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion are greater than one. As in Diamond
and Dybvigs (1983) model impatient agents derive utility only from period 1 consumption and
patient agents from the sum of consumption in both periods 1 and 2..
The postdeposit game starts after the bank designs a deposit contract and consumers have
deposited their endowments. In period 1 each individual learns her own type and decides the
moment in which they will contact the bank. The sequential service constraint, as Peck and Shell
(2003) have dened, implies that the current withdrawal depends on the history of withdrawals.
Putting in a di¤erent way, when consumer arrives at the head of the queue, her period 1 con-
sumption will be allocated on the basis of information already reported by other consumers. The
authors allow for partial suspension.
The resource conditions can be written as
c1(N) = Ny  
N 1P
z=1
c1(z) and c2() =

Ny  
P
z=1
c1(z)

R
N   
(12)
where  is the number of impatient consumers and z = 1; :::; N represents the position in the
queue of each consumer. The banking mechanism, m, could be described by the vector
m = (c1(1); :::; c1(z); :::; c1(N); c2(0); :::; c2(N   1))
and the set of banking mechanisms, which is denoted by M , is given by
M =

m 2 R2N+ : (12) holds for  = 0; :::; N   1
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The ex ante consumer welfare, W (m); is represented by the sum of expected utilities of con-
sumers. Assuming that there are no bank runs, the ex ante consumer welfare under mechanism
m, W^ (m); can be written as
W^ (m) =
N 1P
=0
f()
24 P
z=1
u(c1(z)) + (N   )v
0@Ny  Pz=1 c1(z)R
N 
1A35
+ f(N)

N 1P
z=1
u(c1(z)) + u

Ny  
N 1P
z=1
c1(z)

where f() is the probability that the number of impatient consumers is : Since the optimal
condition ensures that impatient consumers choose period 1 and patient consumers choose period
2, the incentive compatibility constraint is
N 1P
=0
fp()

1
+1
+1P
z=1
v(c1(z))


N 1P
=0
fp()v
0@Ny  Pz=1 c1(z)R
N 
1A (13)
where fp() represents the probability that the number of impatient agents is , conditional
on a consumers being patient:11 The incentive compatibility constraint implies that the sum of
utilities of patient agents who wait until period 2 is greater than the sum of utilities of patient
agents who pretend to be impatient. Thus, patient agents get more utility waiting until period
2.
Assuming no bank runs the optimal contract solves the following optimization problem
max
(c1(1);:::;c1(N 1))
W^ (m)
subject to (13)
The necessary conditions, for ^ = 0; :::; N   1; are
N 1P
=^
f()
24u0(c1(^)) Rv0
0@Ny  Pz=1 c1(z)R
N 
1A35+ f(N) u0(c1(^))  u0 (c1(N))
+ 
8<:N 1P=^ fp()
24v0
0@Ny  Pz=1 c1(z)R
N 
1A   R
N 
  v0(c1(z))   1+1
359=; = 0
(14)
11Using Bayesrule, fp () can be calculate as fp () =
[1 (=N)]f()
N 1P

0
=0
[1 (0=N)]f(0)
.
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and

8>><>>:
N 1X
=0
fp()v
0BB@

Ny  
P
z=1
c1(z)

R
N   
1CCA  N 1X
=0
fp()
"
1
+ 1
+1X
z=1
v(c1(z))
#9>>=>>; = 0 (15)
where  denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on constrain (13). Condition (14) is the derivative in
order to c1; where the number of impatient agents is ^. Condition (15) is the incentive compati-
bility constraint.
So far the authors have assumed that there are no bank runs. However, if patient consumers
prefer to choose period 1 consumption, merely because they believe that other patient consumers
will choose period 1 consumption, there is an equilibrium bank run in the postdeposit game. This
is happens if
1
N
NP
z=1
v(c1(z))  v

Ny  
N 1P
z=1
c1(z)

R

(16)
The ex ante consumer welfare in this situation is given by
W run =
NP
=0
f()


N
NP
z=1
u(c1(z)) + N 
N
NP
z=1
v(c1(z))

(17)
where =N represents the number of impatient agents among the total population and (N   ) =N
the number of patient agents among the total population.
As long as the probability of a run is su¢ ciently small, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggested
that a run can take place in equilibrium with positive probability triggered by some extrinsic
random variable, such as sunspots. Peck and Shell (2003) took the basis of this argument to
formalize the predeposit game, which starts after the bank announces its mechanism.
In period 1 each consumer learns her own type and observes a sunspot variable12, dened as
 and uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The moment in which the consumer arrives at the bank
will depend on the realization of the sunspot variable, as well as the realization of consumers
type.
Suppose the economy has a propensity to run, s; and type 2 agents choose period 1 if  < s:
For su¢ ciently small s the authors proved that consumers are willing to deposit, since other
consumers will do the same, because the overall ex ante welfare which is dened as
sW run(m) + (1  s)W^ (m) (18)
strictly exceeds the welfare under autarky.
Given the mechanismm 2M and a propensity to run, s; the ex ante welfare for the predeposit
game, W (m; s), is denoted by
12Sunspots do not a¤ect preferences, the likelihood of being impatient, endowments or technology.
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W (m; s) =
(
sW run(m) + (1  s)W^ (m) if m has a run equilibrium
W^ (m) if m does not have a run equilibrium
(19)
The optimal mechanism to the predeposit game that maximizes (19) subject to (13) is dened
as s-optimal mechanism, m, and it depends on the selection made by consumers among the
multiple equilibria to the postdeposit game. Incentive compatibility (13) holds as an equality at
the optimum to the postdeposit game when   s, which implies that patient consumers will
choose to withdraw in period 2. As s increases, a bank run is more likely to occur in equilibrium,
and thus the welfare under m falls. If m has a run equilibrium to the postdeposit game, it also
has a run equilibrium for the predeposit game and then  < s:
Example 2 There are two consumer, N = 2; and each of whom is impatient with probability
p and patient with probability 1  p. Types are uncorrelated.
Let c1(1) be denoted by c; the optimization problem simplies to
max W^ = p2 [u(c) + u(2y   c)] + 2p(1  p) [u(c) + v((2y   c)R)] + 2(1  p)2v(yR) (20)
subject to
p
h
v(c)
2
+ v(2y c)
2
i
+ (1  p)v(c)  pv((2y   c)R) + (1  p)v(yR) (21)
The condition for a run equilibrium (16) simplies to
v(c)
2
+
v(2y   c)
2
 v((2y   c)R) (22)
Let the utility functions be given by
u(x) =
Ax1 a
1  a
and
v(x) =
x1 b
1  b
Consider A = 100; a = 1:3; b = 1:3; p = 0:5; R = 1:05 and y = 3 the solution to the optimization
problem is given by
c = 3:14809785738374 (23)
The single choice variable, c; solves the incentive compatibility constraint (21) as an equality.
Thus, (23) is a solution to the banks problem. However, with (23) the left hand side of (22)
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exceeds the right side, where the di¤erence is 0:000179: We may conclude that the optimal
mechanism tolerates the possibility of a run.
As before, let A = 100; a = 1:3; b = 1:3; p = 0:5; R = 1:05 and y = 3 but assuming that
condition (22) is
v(c)
2
+
v(2y   c)
2
 v((2y   c)R) (24)
Under this mechanism the system is immune from runs. The solution to the planners problem
is given by
c = 3:00008233417688 (25)
where (22) holds as an equality. Consumption is less than the consumption under a mechanism
which tolerates the possibility of run. The ex ante consumer welfare, when runs are not allowing,
W^ (mno run) =  242; 103 is less than W^ (m) =  240; 458, the ex ante consumer welfare under
a mechanism that tolerates the probability of a run. It is obvious that consumers get a higher
benet under a mechanism which tolerates the probability of a run, as long as that probability
is su¢ ciently small.
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2.5 Conclusion
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) attempted to analyze the economic role of banks in the nancial
intermediation. In their model a self-fullling bank run could occur. However, a contract under
an appropriate arrangement would remove all incentives for depositors to run. In the setting with
no aggregate uncertainty the authors showed that, in event of a run, suspension of convertibility
guarantees that banking system will be able to meet all of its future obligations. Under this
contract, depositors without an urgent need for their funds have no incentive to withdraw and,
therefore, a run will never start.
Based on Diamond and Dybvigs (1983) model, Wallace (1988) assumed that people are
isolated at the early withdrawal time. The author concluded that isolation is needed to the
voluntary participation in an illiquid banking arrangement. In the aggregate risk version of the
model, Wallace (1990) showed that agents who encountered the bank late end up worse o¤ than
those who contact the bank early. In this sense, the best arrangement may display some aspect
of partial suspensions.
Green and Lin (2003) used a backward induction argument to solve the banks problem. This
is so because they considered that agents observe their own arrival, as well as their position in
line. Agents who arrive very late can be almost certain that they are in the end of the queue and
thus will always reveal their true types. Under this specication, the authors concluded that the
ex ante rst best allocation - which maximizes expected utility when information about types is
public - is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model when information about types is private.
The work of Wallace (1988, 1990) and Green-Lin (2003) were a good contribution for the
formalization of the sequential service constraint, specially when the number of impatient agents
is unknown. Both concluded that banks can generate e¢ cient allocations of resources without
allowing for self-fullling runs.
Peck-Shell (2003) brought back the possibility of runs into the banking panic literature. In
their model, the utility function di¤ers across types and, in contrast with Green-Lin (2003),
agents have no information about their own position in line. The authors showed by examples
that, given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots, the optimal contract for the full predeposit
game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability.
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3 Information-based bank runs
In Europes most economically stricken countries, people are taking their money out of banks
as a way to protect their savings from the growing nancial storm. People are worried that their
savings could be devalued if their country stops using the euro, or that banks are on the verge of
collapse and that governments cannot make good on deposit insurance. in Fox News13
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bryant (1980) have provided the classic benchmarks for the
bank runs literature. They developed models of banking to explore panics and their prevention.
As it was noted by Jacklin (1987), both raise an important role for the demand deposit as a
mechanism that facilitates risk sharing among depositors. However, they di¤er in the leading
approach of the origins and causes of bank runs.
A common view of panics was described in the previous chapter. According to Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), a bank run is caused by shifts in the beliefs of agents, which are unrelated to the
real economy, in settings with multiple equilibria. In this chapter we will describe an alternative
to this sunspotview of runs.
The information-based theory explains panics as an outgrowth of the business cycle. An
economic downturn raises the possibility that banks are unable to meet their commitments. As
a result, if depositors receive information about an impending downturn in the cycle, they will
anticipate that the bank assets will be lower and may try to withdraw their deposits. According
to this interpretation, panics are no longer a response to an extrinsic random variable but a
response to unfolding economic circumstances.
The empirical evidence that links bank runs to economic conditions is well documented.
Gorton (1988) studied bank panics in the United States during the Banking Era (1865-1914).
The author used data for the American Banks and investigated whether the model and variables
that explain the behavior of deposits during no-panic situations also explain their behavior during
panics. His work concluded that panics are correlated with the arrival of new information,
which will determine the depositorsdesire to withdraw funds from the bank. More recently,
Schumacher (2000) argued that empirical work on depositors run behavior is more compatible
with the information-based approach to panics. Moreover, the author concluded that not all
banks are equally likely to experience a run during a panic. In particular, a questionable solvency
position tends to increase the probability of depositors running on a bank. Despite of these
ndings, Ennis (2003) pointed out that, in some cases, banking panics are associated with the
existence of multiple equilibrium outcomes, i.e. situations where both the panic and no-panic
outcomes are possible.
In this chapter, we will discuss four models which are consistent with the business cycle view
of the origins of banking panics: Bryant (1980), Chari-Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin-Bhattacharya
(1988) and Allen-Gale (1998).
13http://www.foxnews.com
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The work of Bryant (1980) pioneered this branch of literature. The author examined the
instabilities and imperfect risk-sharing that would arise, if bank depositors make earlier with-
drawals based on information about asset returns. Chari and Jagannathan (1988) assumed that
part of the population observes a signal about future returns and that the other part tries to
deduce, from observed withdrawals, whether a non favorable signal was received by the informed
group. The model developed by Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), which we will explore in some
detail, relates the source of runs with the interim information that depositors have about the
bank loans and asset payo¤s. The authors analyzed the welfare implications of such behavior
on the choice of intermediary contracts forms, namely between nontraded deposits and traded
equity contracts. Allen and Gale (1998) were not focused mainly on modelling bank runs, as
the previous literature, but rather on the cost and benet analysis of bank runs. Their ndings
somewhat contrast with the history of the nancial systems, which seems to be based on the
premise that banking panics are bad and should be eliminated. In line with the previous chapter,
we end with the main conclusions.
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3.1 Bryant (1980)
In this model, time is discrete and there are two types of individuals: type 1 and type 2. Everyone
lives two periods and there is a continuum of measure one of each type of individuals born in
each period. It is assumed the existence of a non-storable, but transferable consumption good, as
well as a costly intermediation technology, in which individuals of type 1 can trade goods today
for goods tomorrow with individuals of type 2. Agents attempt to maximize their utility of rst
and second period consumption and there is a free entry into the banking sector.
Bryant (1980) designed a model of borrowing and lending which can be viewed as occurring
as follows: the bank gets dollars from the young type 1 individuals and lends them to the young
of type 2 individuals, for promises of dollars tomorrow; on the other hand, the young type
2 individuals exchange these dollars for goods with the young type 1 individuals, who get a
quantity of M dollars of at money for this exchange.14
In order to introduce a demand for liquidity into the model, the author assumed that a
percentage of individuals of type 1, ; dies in the middle of their second period of life. However,
each individual who nds out that she will die early has no way to reveal this information.15
Only the individuals who die early will have an incentive to make early withdrawals. For that
reason, the bank should provide insurance for the risk of early diersby allowing deposits to
be withdrawn at any time. Nevertheless, the uninsurable risk that generates demand liabilities
is not su¢ cient to produce bank runs. Bryant (1980) argued that what is crucial for the bank
run is the coexistence of the uninsurable risk of early death and asymmetric information on the
risky assets.
At this point, the model states that the endowment of type 2 individuals is risky and that
there is a small probability that these individuals, of a particular generation, will be endowed
with less than their period 2 consumption. Moreover, it is assumed that a percentage, ; of type 1
individuals gets information that a bad outcome is about to occur. The informed individuals will
withdraw their deposits but the bank is not able to distinguish the reason for that. Putting in a
di¤erent way, the bank does not know if it is in the presence of an early dieror a knowledgeable
individual. However, once more than  percent of deposits are withdrawn, the bank realizes that
a banking panic is on and that its loans are bad. This knowledge is randomly distributed over the
population, it is not publicly veriable and it appears just before individuals discover whether
they will die young.
In the presence of a banking panic, the author showed that the private market may not be
able to solve the problem. Rather, the government has several devices to insure deposits. For
example, it can promise a tax to the next generation in the bad state, or it can print money to
meet any deposit demand.
14The model considers a stationary monetary equilibria where the value of at money is constant through time.
15It should be noted that the author was not seriously advancing premonition of death as an explanation for
an uninsurable demand for liquidity. Rather, this is just a device for introducing such a demand to the model.
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3.2 Chari and Jagannathan (1988)
The model considers a single commodity and three time periods, t = 0; 1; 2 being period 0
the planning period. There are a continuum of consumers on the interval [0; 1] ; each of whom
endowed with one unit of the good at t = 0:
An investment decision made in period 0 yields a sure return at t = 1; but this return
is a¤ected by an exogenously imposed externality. Let K represent the aggregate volume of
investment, the realized output in period 1, y1; is described as follows(
y1 = ko   k if K > K
y1 = (1  a) (ko   k) if K < K
where 0  a  1 and K; which are exogenously specied, represent the cost of early liquidation16.
The pair (ko; k) represents the investment plan for an individual in periods 0 and 1, respectively.
Investments can be transformed into consumption goods at a cost that depends upon the aggre-
gate amount of consumption, K: Hence, if a few number of individuals wish to consume at t = 1,
the total return on investment is 1; on the other hand, if a large number of individuals wish to
consume, the period 1 consumption is low. Resources, which are reinvested in period 1, generate
a random return of R in period 2. As result, the output in that period, y2; is given by
y2 = Rk
where R can be dened as a high return or a low return with the respective probabilities
R =
(
Rh > 1 with probability p
Rl = 0 with probability 1  p
All individuals in the economy are risk neutral and maximize expected utility of consumption.
It is assumed the existence of two di¤erent types of individuals, where type 1 agents prefer period
1 consumption and type 2 agents derive utility from consumption in both periods 1 and 2. The
utility functions of the respective types are, then, dened as
U1(c1; c2) = c1 + c2
U2(c1; c2) = c1 + c2
the pair (c1; c2) represents consumption levels of the commodity in periods 1 and 2, respectively;
and  is a positive discount factor arbitrarily close to zero.
At the planning period no one knows her own type. A random fraction, ; of individuals
are of type 1 agents and this variable can take one of three possible values  2 f0; 1; 2g with
16The authors assumed, and we agree, that the exogeneity imposed to liquidation costs is a troublesome issue
to their model.
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probabilities p0 ; p1 and p2. In the beginning of period 1, each individual learns her type and
a random fraction of agents, ; receive information about the expected returns of period 2. The
model assumes that this information is perfect and  2 0; 	 :
In order to ensure that individuals have a nontrivial signal-extration problem, the model
states that
1 =  (26)
2 = 1 +  (1  1) (27)
these assumptions allow for some confusion in the observation of the signal by uninformed agents.
Moreover, the model assumes
K = 1  2 (28)
and
pRh + (1  p)Rl > 1 (29)
The random variables ;R and  are independent of each other and together they describe the
state of nature  = (; ;R) :
The only public information, available in the economy, is the aggregate investment level, K.
Therefore, individuals just observe the fraction of population that chooses to continue investing,
rather than the reasons to do so. Note that if 1 agents decide not to reinvest, equation (26) tells
us that there are no bad news and that, the fraction of impatient agents is 0 or that  = 0 and
 agents, having received bad news, prefer to withdraw earlier. On the other hand, if 2 agents
wish not to reinvest, by equation (27) it is possible to conclude that there are 2 impatient agents
or there are 1 impatient agents and (1  1) patient agents who received information about a
negative future outcome for R:
In the planning period all individuals decide to invest one unit of consumption good, because
no one cares about period 0 consumption. At t = 1 each individual learns her own type and type 1
agents consume all their resources by liquidating their investment. In the same period, a random
fraction of agents, ; receives a informative signal which makes them to update their beliefs about
the expected return of period 2. If the informed agents get information that the return is Rl; they
will liquidate their investments in period 1. When the group of early withdrawals is unusually
large, the uninformed patient agents will have an incentive to liquidate their investments and
will precipitate a run. This happens because uninformed patient agents condition their beliefs,
about the banks long-term technology, on the size of the withdrawal queue at the bank.
In this model, the panic equilibrium outcome occurs only if there is confusion between a
large number of individuals unexpectedly desiring to liquidate their investments for transactions
reasons and the possibility that some individuals have received information that returns are
expected to be poor. In fact, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) showed that banking panics may
occur even for  = 0: If uninformed patient agents observe that 2 agents are withdrawing their
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investments, they may infer su¢ ciently adverse information that makes them to believe that 1
impatient agents and (1  2) patient agents, who are informed about a negative outcome, are
withdrawing their investments and, therefore, they panic.
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3.3 Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988)
The model developed by Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) assumes the existence of three time
periods, t = 0; 1; 2. In period 0 all agents are endowed with one unit of consumption good
and they do not know their own types. This uncertainty will be resolved in period 1, but it is
privately known.
There are two investment technologies: a short-lived one from t = 0 to t = 1 and a long-lived
one from t = 0 to t = 2: The two period technology cannot be liquidated early, putting in a
di¤erent way the long-lived asset yields a zero payo¤ if liquidated at t = 1: This return is a
random variable, R; which takes one of the two possible outcomes
R =
(
Rh > 1 with probability 
Rl < 1 with probability 1  
Rh is dened as a high return and Rl a low return, where 0 < Rl < Rh.
At t = 1 a fraction of agents, ; observes a signal, s; which they use to update their prior
assessments on R: Given that Rl and Rh are xed, ^ describes the posterior beliefs about R;
which are always consistent with the priors, thus
 =
P
s
prob(s)^s
where ^s is the value of ^ given that s is observed.
Preferences are smooth in period 1 and period 2 consumption. Each agents preference shock
is a random variable, Z; with a Bernoulli distribution over f1; 2g with probability p of Z = 1:
Agentsconditional preferences over consumption vectors fc1; c2g at t = 1 and t = 2 are, then,
described by the utility functions V (c1; c2; Z) = U(c1) + ZU(c2) where f1; 2g 2 (0; 1] are the
agentsintertemporal discount factors, with 2(> 1) agents being termed late (early) diers.
Let cit be the consumption of type i in period t and L the investment in the liquid, short-lived,
asset at t = 0: The optimal contract choice problem for a deposit contract, in the absence of
interim information, is solved by the ve-vector of functions fc11; c21; c12(R); c22(R); Lg :
The constrained social optimization is given by
V  = max E fpV (c11; c12(R); 1) + (1  p)V (c21; c22(R); 2)g
fcitg R
(30)
subject to
L  pc11 + (1  p)c21 (31)
R(1  L)  pc12(R) + (1  p)c22(R) (32)
V (ci1; c
i
2;; i)  expected utility obtained from misrepresenting true type for i = 1; 2 (33)
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Conditions (31) and (32) represent the resource balance constraints and condition (33) is the
incentive compatibility constraint. In solving the constrained optimization it is necessary only
to consider the type 1 incentive compatibility constraint, because the authors proved that the
type 2 constraint is never binding.
The rst-order conditions for the optimization above are
1 =

1 + 3
p

@V (c11;c
1
2(R);1)
@c11
(34)
2 =

1 + 3
p

@V (c11;c
1
2(R);1)
@c12(R)
(35)
1 =
@V (c21;c
2
2(R);2)
@c21
  3
(1 p)
@V (c21;c22(R);1)
@c21
(36)
2 =
@V (c21;c
2
2(R);2)
@c22(R)
  3
(1 p)
@V (c21;c22(R);1)
@c22(R)
(37)
L = pc11 + (1  p)c21 (38)
R(1  L) = pc12(R) + (1  p)c22(R) (39)
V
 
c11; c
1
2 (R) ; 1

= E

V
 
c21; c
2
2 (R) ; 1
	
(40)
where 1 > 0; 2 > 0 and 3 > 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints (31),
(32) and (33) ; respectively.
The demand deposit contract, as it was dened by the authors, requires an initial investment
at t = 1 in exchange for the right to withdraw per unit of investment, conditional on the
depositorspreferences and the banks solvency. This contract is chosen to maximize ex ante
expected utility when the interim information available at t = 1 is taken into account.
If R = Rh the bank pays its promised second period return. On the other hand, if R = Rl the
bank is considered insolvent in the second period and paysRl=Rh of its promised payments. Given
the assumed preference structure, Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) showed that this policy is
socially optimal. Moreover, they proved that the constrained social optimization problem, which
was presented above is equivalent to the modied optimization that we develop next, for that
specic preference structure.
Example 3 Dene a square root utility function as U(ct) =
p
ct and 1 =  < 1 and 2 = 1:
The constrained social optimization problem is given by
max
c11;c
1
2;c
2
1;c
2
2
p
p
c11 + A
p
c12

+ (1  p)
p
c21 + A
p
c22

(41)
subject to 
c11 +
c12
Rh

p+

c21 +
c22
Rh

(1  p) = 1 (42)
26
q
c11 + A
q
c12  
q
c21   A
q
c22  0 (43)
where A = 1    + (Rl=Rh)1=2: Condition (43) is the incentive compatibility constraint which
guarantees that type 1 depositors will prefer type 1 withdrawal stream (c11; c
1
2) instead of type 2
withdrawal stream (c21; c
2
2):
The rst-order conditions are
21 =
1p
c11

1 +
2
p

(44)
21 =

1  2
1  p
 
1p
c21
!
(45)
21
Rh
= A

1 +
2
p

1p
c12
(46)
21
Rh
=

1  2
(1  p)

Ap
c22
(47)

c11 +
c12
Rh

p+ (c21 +
c22
Rh
)(1  p) = 1 (48)q
c11 + A
q
c12 =
q
c21 + A
q
c22 (49)
If we consider the following information structure
with probability 0:9 s = s1 ) ^1 = 0:05
with probability 0:1 s = s2 ) ^2 = 0:90
and since
 =
P
s
prob(s)^s
the value of  will be
 = 0:135
Let p = 0:5;  = 0:2; Rl = 0:001 and Rh = 1:05 and, thus, A = 0:869166190448976: It is possible
to nd the optimal values of c11; c
2
1; c
1
2 and c
2
2; that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
with equality
c11 = 0:799955618871287
c21 = 0:625292945096846
c12 = 0:026650792721985
c22 = 0:576838215111475
It should be noted that the model states that the bank allows individuals to make type 1 with-
drawals until a proportion p have done so. Beyond this point only the type 2 withdrawals are
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allowed.
If we substitute the parameter values into the solution presented by the authors, we do not
nd the same results for c11; c
2
1; c
1
2; c
2
2: Plugging both our solution and Jacklin and Bhattacharyas
(1988) solution in the value function, it is clear that our solution yields higher utility. Therefore,
we feel safe in concluding that the expressions in the Jacklin and Bhattacharyas (1988) model,
which we were not able to derive, may have some mistakes.
Dene
A
0
= 1  ^ + ^
r
Rl
Rh
(50)
if some type 2 agents receive information that causes them to update their probability assessment
of R = Rl from  to ^; they may prefer the type 1 withdrawal over the type 2 withdrawal and,
then
E^

V
 
c21; c
2
2; 2

< E^

V
 
c11; c
1
2; 2

where E^ indicates expectation using the revised probability assessment, that is for what values
of A
0 q
c21 + A
0
q
c22 <
q
c11 + A
0
q
c12 (51)
which results in the following expression
^ >  + (1  )
 p
Rhp
Rh  
p
Rl

(52)
Dene
 =  + (1  )
 p
Rhp
Rh  
p
Rl

(53)
where  represents the run threshold level in which type 2 agents prefer the type 1 allocation.
Type 2 agents, who receive information that leads them to update their assessment of the prob-
ability that R = Rl from  to ^ > , prefer the allocation (c11; c
1
2) to (c
2
1; c
2
2) : Substituting all
values into the expression (53) we get
 = 0:852474702377151
Comparing the value of  with ^2 = 0:9 of state 2, ^2 > ; lead us to the conclusion that, in this
particular case, there is a possibility of a bank run17.
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) analyzed the equilibrium outcomes of what they labelled
an equity economywith no banks. From the welfare comparisons, the authors concluded that
the greater is the percentage of informed agents, the worse deposit contracts perform relative
to equity contracts. This happens because the run threshold level, ; is inversely related to
17Incidentally, the authors showed that with U(c) = c1 = (1  ) bank runs never occur in equilibrium.
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the variance of returns. However, as dispersion of asset returns increases, beyond the level at
with runs are introduced, the expected utility from using deposit contracts increases relative to
expected utility from using equity contracts. In that case, the informed agents who successfully
make type 1 withdrawals benet relatively more from making early withdrawals. In the absence
of information, nontraded demand deposit contracts dominate equity contracts for all levels of
the dispersion of the asset return. This is true because of the irreversibility assumption about
the long lived asset, which eliminates pure panic runs when there is no information about R:
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3.4 Allen and Gale (1998)
Allen and Gale (1998) provided an extensive analysis about the optimal policies that should be
implemented to deal with panics. The assumptions of their model are the ones that became
standard after the Diamond and Dybvigs (1983) model, however their view of the origins and
causes of runs is related with the work of Bryant (1980).
Time is divided into three periods, t = 0; 1; 2; and there is a continuum of ex ante identical
consumers, who have an endowment of the consumption good at the rst period and none after
that. Consumers are uncertain about their preferences, in which some will be early consumers,
who only want to consume in period 1, and others will be late consumers, who only want to
consume at period 2. For simplicity, the model assumes that each consumer has an equal chance
of belonging to each group implying, by the law of large numbers, that the fraction of early
and late consumers is 1=2: Nevertheless, the authors showed the results all remain valid when
the probabilities of being an early and late consumer di¤er. Then, a typical consumers utility
function can be written as
U (c1; c2) =
(
u (c1) with probability 1=2
u (c2) with probability 1=2
where ct denotes consumption at t = 1; 2:
The model also considers the existence of two types of assets: a safe asset and a risky asset.
The safe asset can be dened as a storage technology, which transforms one unit of consumption
good at t into one unit of consumption good at t + 1: The risky asset is represented by a
stochastic production technology that transforms one unit of consumption at t = 0 into R units
of the consumption good at t = 2. This asset cannot be liquidated at t = 1:
In the beginning of period 1, each depositor learns whether she is an early or late consumer,
as well as they observe a signal which provides a perfect information about the value of R: The
model states that this information becomes available before the returns are realized.
Since there is free entry into the banking sector, each bank faces an optimal risk-sharing prob-
lem, which o¤ers a demand deposit contract that maximizes the expected utility of consumers.
The authors considered a variety of di¤erent risk sharing problems, corresponding to di¤erent
assumptions about the informational and regulatory environment. In fact, they assumed three
cases: (1) there are no costs of early withdrawal; (2) there is a real cost of early withdrawal; and
(3) there is an asset market where the risky asset can be traded. Each of those brought them
interesting ndings about the central bank intervention in the banking panic episodes.
In contrast with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the model does not assume the rst-come, rst-
served assumption. Allen and Gale (1998) dened a standard deposit contract which promises a
xed amount at each date and pays out all available liquid assets, divided equally among those
withdrawing, in the event that the bank does not have enough liquid assets to make the promised
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payment.
In the rst case, where no cost of early withdrawal are assumed, let X and L denote the
representative banks holding of the risky and safe assets, respectively, and c1(R) and c2(R) the
consumption of early and late consumers conditional on the return to the risky assets, R: The
standard deposit contract promises the early consumers either c or, if that is infeasible, an equal
share of the liquid assets L: It should be noted that a fraction of late consumers, (R); may want
to withdraw early as well. In that case, in equilibrium the early and late individuals will have
the same consumption. Formally, this amounts to saying that
c1(R)  c (54)
c1(R) + (R)c2(R) = L if c1(R) < c (55)
c1(R) = c2(R) if (R) > 0 (56)
Depositors can observe a leading indicator and make their withdrawal decision conditional
on it. When late consumers observe that returns are going to be high, they will leave their funds
in the bank until period 2. On the other hand, if returns are expected to be low, they attempt
to withdraw their deposits and lead to the possibility of a bank run. At this point, the total
illiquidity of the risky asset plays an important equilibrating role. As it was already noted, the
risky asset cannot be liquidated in period 1, thus, there is always something left to pay the late
withdrawers at t = 2: Hence, bank runs are typically partial and they involve only a fraction of
late consumers, (R); who decide to withdraw early conditional on the risky return, R:
Allen and Gale (1998) showed that a banking system subject to runs can achieve rst-best
e¢ ciency using the standard deposit contract. Therefore, they considered that, under these
circumstances, there is no justication for central bank intervention. This is, in fact, consistent
with the observation that, prior to central bank and government intervention, banks chose not
to eliminate the possibility of runs.
Until now, the model states that safe asset liquidated at t = 1 yields the same return whether
it is being held by the early-withdrawing late consumers or by the bank. For this reason, bank
runs make allocations contingent on R without diminishing asset returns. However, if liquidating
the safe asset at t = 1 involved a cost there would be a trade-o¤ between optimal risk sharing
and the return realized on the banks payo¤.
In order to illustrate the consequence of liquidation costs, the authors introduce a real cost
of early withdrawals. They assume that the storage technology available to the banks is strictly
more productive than the storage technology available to late consumers who withdraw their
deposits in a bank run.
Between periods 0 and 1, the return on safe asset is always 1, but it will be r > 1 from t = 1
until t = 2: All the safe asset is held by the bank and the model assumes that is less productive
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on average that the risky asset, which is the same as saying
E [R] > r
The change in the assumption about the rate of return on safe asset appears to be innocuous
in the standard deposit contract, however the equilibrium must be more carefully specied. It is
needed to take explicit account of the fraction (R) of late consumers, who desire to withdraw
early, because their decision a¤ects the total amount of consumption available. The model
considers that a unit of consumption withdrawn in period 1 reduces consumption at t = 2 by
r > 1: If (R) = 0 there are no runs and thus
c1(R) = c (57)
c2(R) = r(L  c) +RX  c (58)
on the other hand, if (R) > 0 there is a run and
c1(R) = c2(R) < c (59)
The authors showed that with no runs the early consumers are paid the promised amount c and
there will be just enough to provide the late consumers with a level of consumption that satises
the incentive compatibility constraint. Moreover, Allen and Gale (1998) argued that there is a
run if only if c1(R) < c, and that is equivalent to having R < R; where R is dened implicitly
by the condition
c = r(L  c) +RX (60)
With R < R it is impossible to pay the early consumers the xed amount c, promised by
the standard deposit contract, without violating the late consumersincentive constraint. Since
there is a cost attached to making the consumption allocation contingent on the return to the
risky asset, incentive e¢ cient risk sharing does not hold in an equilibrium with bank runs. This
equilibrium is an ine¢ cient allocation because liquidating the safe asset at t = 1 and storing the
proceeds until t = 2 is less productive than reinvesting them in safe assets held by bank.
A simple monetary intervention by the central bank can eliminate the ine¢ ciency. Consider
the following: the central bank makes an interest-free loan to the bank and, hence, the bank
gives to depositors a combination of money and consumption whose value equals the xed amount
promised in the deposit contract. Since the model states that the return on money is greater than
the return on goods, the early consumers will exchange their money with the late consumers.
The early consumers end up with the rst-best consumption level and late consumers hold only
money between periods 1 and 2. In the last period, early-withdrawing late consumer supply all
their money to the bank in exchange for goods. In this sense, the bank gets back just enough
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money to repay its loan from the central bank, and has enough goods left over to give each late-
withdrawing consumer c2(R): Allen and Gale (1998) argued that the central policy just described
removes the deadweight costs of bank runs but it does not prevent the runs themselves.
In the last section of the paper, it is introduced a competitive asset market in which the
risky asset can be traded. The participants in the market are the banks and a large number
of wealthy, risk neutral speculators, who make direct investments in the safe and risky assets.
Speculators consume only in last period and their objective is to maximize the expected value
of their portfolio at t = 2:
In contrast with the previous case, the return on the safe asset is the same inside and outside
the banking system, r = 1: Despite that, bank runs may be costly. A run will occur if and only
if it is impossible to pay the early consumers c and pay the late consumers an amount at least as
great as c: In that case, the bank is forced to liquidate its assets and pay all consumers less than
c: Since a late withdrawer will receive nothing, a partial run is no longer possible in equilibrium
and all late consumers will prefer to make early withdrawals. Therefore
c1(R) = c2(R) =
1
2
(L+ P (R)X) (61)
where P (R) is the market price of the risky asset.
When the bank is forced to liquidate the risky asset, it sells the asset at a low price. Simul-
taneous liquidation drives asset prices down and allows speculators in the asset market to prot.
In this sense, there is a transferable value to speculators and, thus the market is providing a
negative insurance.
Once again, a central bank intervention is needed to prevent the collapse in prices in the asset
market. In the event of a bank run the central bank enters into a repurchase agreement, or a
collateralized loan, with the bank under which the bank sells some of its assets to the central
bank at t = 1 in exchange for money and buys them back for the same price at t = 2:
As before, the model assumes that a standard deposit contract promises to depositors a xed
amount of money D in period 1 and pays out the remaining value of the assets in the last period.
Since (R) is the fraction of late consumers who withdraw early, the amount injected into the
system must be (R)D: For simplicity, the model states that the amount of cash injected is a
constant M . The bank sells assets at t = 1 for an amount of cash equal to M and repurchases
them at t = 2 for the same cash value. Such optimal policy will eliminate the deadweight costs
of runs that arise from premature liquidation, rather than eliminating the runs themselves.
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3.5 Conclusion
In a model of borrowing and lending, Bryant (1980) concluded that a bank run occurs because
the coexistence of the uninsurable risk of early death and asymmetric information on the risk
assets. In the presence of a banking panic, the author argued that government has several devices
to insure deposits that are unavailable to private sector.
In Chari and Jagannathans (1988) model it is possible to nd two di¤erent groups of in-
dividuals: the informed group and the uninformed group. Basically, the rst group observe a
signal about future returns and the second one tries to deduce whether a non favorable signal was
received by the rst group. Within this setup, bank runs occur because uninformed individuals
condition their beliefs on the number of depositors who line up to withdraw their funds. If this
line is unusually large, the uninformed patient agents may infer su¢ ciently adverse information
to precipitate a run. In this sense, the authors concluded that there is a run equilibrium even
when depositors have no negative private information.
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) made a welfare comparison between nontraded deposits
and traded equity contracts. They were able to show that the optimal choice can depend on the
underlying risk and informational attributes of assets. The greater is the percentage of informed
agents, the worse deposit contracts perform relative to equity contracts. On the other hand,
informed agents, who successfully make type 1 withdrawals, benet relatively more from making
early withdrawals when the dispersion of asset returns increases beyond the level at with runs
are introduced. In the absence of information, nontraded demand deposit contracts dominate
equity contracts for all levels of the dispersion of the asset return.
An interesting addition to this literature is the model developed by Allen and Gale (1998),
which try to understand the role of central banks in dealing with panics. The authors demon-
strated that, under certain circumstances, equilibria that allow for bank runs can be rst best
e¢ cient and eliminating runs is an extreme policy that imposes costly constraints on the banking
system. However, laissez-faire is no longer optimal if there are liquidation costs or markets for
risky assets and, thus, a central bank intervention is needed to achieve the optimum. In the
rst case, a central bank can avoid the unnecessary costs of bank runs while continuing to allow
runs to fulll their risk-sharing function. In the second, the central bank intervention allows the
nancial system to share risks without incurring the costs of ine¢ cient investment.
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4 The model
Depositors in Vietnam have withdrawn hundreds of millions of dollars from Asia Commercial
Bank, one of the countrys largest banks, after the arrest of tycoon Nguyen Duc Kien, one of its
founders. in Belle News18
In the fourth chapter of this thesis, we will develop a model within the traditions of sunspots
and information-based runs. The main motivation of this work is to compare, from a welfare
point of view, two di¤erent banking regulations that try to avoid or mitigate the e¤ects of bank
runs - suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance. With the rst mechanism, payments
are suspended at a certain level and with the second, deposits are always guaranteed when the
bank fails.
The structure of this chapter is straightforward. We start by describing the environment and,
after that, we solve the problem by assuming rst that agents are in autarky and second that
there is an omnipresent social planner. After showing that the social optimal solution cannot be
supported as a Nash equilibrium, when depositors observe a macroeconomic indicator, we will
solve the problem allowing suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance. Then, we will be
able to compare these two arrangements from a welfare point of view.
4.1 The environment
There are three time periods, t = 0; 1; 2 and a single homogenous good. On the consumer side
of the economy, there is a continuum of ex ante identical agents of measure one, uniformly
distributed, that are endowed with one unit of the consumption good at t = 0 and none after
that. In period 1, agents are subject to a privately observed preference shock and they can be
of either of two types: type 1 and type 2. Individuals of type 1 are also designated as impatient
agents who only care about consumption in period 1; type 2 agents are patient consumers who
can wait to consume in period 2. At t = 0 individuals do not know whether they will be type
1 or type 2 agents, but they know that the probability of being impatient is  2 (0; 1). As it is
standard in literature, we invoke the law of large numbers to argue that the fraction of type 1
agents among the total population is also given by : In this sense, there is individual uncertainty
over tastes but no aggregate uncertainty.
The utility function of each agent is given by
u (c1; c2) =
(
(c1)
1 
1  if type 1
(c2)
1 
1  if type 2
where c1 is the period 1 consumption, c2 is the period 2 consumption and  > 1; which implies
a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient above one.
18http://www.bellenews.com
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There are two types of technologies available: safe and risky. The safe and liquid technology,
which can be interpreted as a storage technology, yields a return of one at any future time
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
 1 a (1  a)
with a 2 [0; 1] : The risky and not completely liquid technology19 generates a return R in period
2 for each unit invested at t = 0. If in period 1 the technology is interrupted the return is Rl < 1
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
 1 aRl (1  a)R
with a 2 [0; 1] : The return R is stochastic and there are two possible outcomes: a high return,
Rh; or a low return, Rl
R =
(
Rh > 1 with probability  ()
Rl < 1 with probability 1   ()
In period 1, all agents observe a macroeconomic indicator, ; which gives them information
about the outcome in period 2. In contrast with previous literature, the information provided
by this indicator is imperfect.20 We will consider that  is a continuous random variable with a
uniform distribution between zero and one. Moreover 0 () > 0;  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1. Given
that the probability of a high return increases with , we can interpret high realizations of  as
good news.
Let the ex ante probability of a good outcome be given by , where
 =
1R
0
 () d
and
E (R) = Rh + (1  )Rl
we assume that E (R) > 1: Therefore, in period 0 when investment decisions are made, the
illiquid technology presents a higher expected return than the storage technology.21
In line with the standard banking literature, the bank behaves competitively which implies
19By not completely liquid technology we mean that much of its value is lost if the project is terminated early.
Cooper and Ross (1998) showed that the possibility of runs could lead the bank to hold excess liquidity.
20Typically, it is assumed that only a fraction of agents observe the signal, which provides them with perfect
information. We consider, instead, that the signal is common knowledge, but that it is a noisy signal.
21These assumptions allow for a great deal of exibility. For example, if  () = x; with x > 0 we have that
 =
R 1
0
(x) d = 1= (x+ 1) : Then, even with a very simple and manageable example, our assumptions about
the distribution of returns are exible enough to allow the ex ante probability of a good return to vary between
zero and one.
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that the equilibrium deposit contract will be the one that maximizes the expected ex ante utility
of consumers.
In period 0 all agents decide whether to deposit funds in the bank or to invest their unit
endowment themselves. Since they do not know their preferences until after the opportunity to
invest has passed, the bank allocate some resources into illiquid investment and provide insurance
to the event that some individuals become impatient agents. In the beginning of period 1 each
type 1 agent contacts the bank and makes early withdrawals. Type 2 agents, however play a
strategic game in that period. They could choose to wait until period 2 or withdraw their funds
in period 1. In general, this decision may depend on what other patient agents are doing.
As in Cooper and Ross (1998) and Ennis and Keister (2003) we consider simple deposit
contracts which have three common features: the fraction of deposits that is invested in liquid
asset (denoted by ); the xed payment promised to depositors who withdraw in period 1 (with
abuse of notation we will call this c1); and the resources available in the bank in period 2 will be
divided among the remaining depositors. Since the bank chooses the contract before observing
the return R; the values of  and c1 depend only on the probability distribution of R and not on
the particular realization of R:
4.2 The individuals problem with no banks
We start our analysis with a simple problem by assuming that there is no bank in the economy,
agents have access to both technologies and they do not trade among themselves. Each individual
problem is given by
max
;c1;c2(Rl);c2(Rh)
WNB = u (c1) + (1  ) [u (c2 (Rh)) + (1  )u (c2 (Rl))]
subject to
c1 = + (1  )Rl
c2 (Rl) = + (1  )Rl
c2 (Rh) = + (1  )Rh
0    1
where WNB represents the ex ante consumer welfare with no banks;  is the proportion of the
deposits that is invested in the storage technology; c1 is the consumption if the agent turns out
to be of type 1; c2 (Rl) is the consumption if the agent turns out to be of type 2 and the bad
outcome occurs; and c2 (Rh) is the consumption of a type 2 agent in the case of high return.
This problem can easily be simplied becoming a very standard textbook microeconomic
problem
max

WNB = ! [u (+ (1  )Rl)] + (1  !) [u (+ (1  )Rh)]
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subject to
0    1
where ! = +(1  ) (1  ) : The solution of this problem is trivial: if  = 1; the consumption
of type 1 and type 2 agents will be exactly one; if  < 1; consumption of type 1 agents will be
smaller than one and the expected consumption of the type 2 agent will be strictly greater than
one.
4.3 First best allocation
As it was already noted, banks o¤er risk sharing contracts to individuals that are uncertain about
their liquidity needs. Formally, a demand deposit contract is dened as a contract that requires
an initial investment at t = 0 with the bank in exchange for the right to withdraw a certain
amount per unit of initial investment.
In order to nd the rst best allocation, we rst consider that depositorstypes are observable
and hence contracts can be made contingent on the depositors type. With this setup, the banks
problem may be interpreted as a social planners problem whose objective is to maximize the
sum of utilities. After determining the rst best allocation we will study its properties, namely if
there is liquidity risk sharing among agents and if the allocation can be implemented as a Nash
equilibrium.
The banks problem is given by
max
;c1
W SP = u (c1) + (1  )
h
u

 c1+(1 )Rh
1 

+ (1  )u

 c1+(1 )Rl
1 
i
subject to
c1  
0    1
where the ex ante consumer welfare in the social planner is denoted by W SP ;  is the proportion
of the deposit that is invested in the storage technology; c1 is the consumption of type 1 agents;
and period 2 consumption of type 2 agents is dened as8>><>>:
c2 =
( c1+(1 )Rh)
(1 ) if R = Rh
c2 =
( c1+(1 )Rl)
(1 ) if R = Rl
In the optimization problem above the second constraint is simply a feasibility constraint. The
rst constraint implies that the total amount to be paid in the rst period, c1, cannot be larger
than the total investment done in the liquid asset. This is so because the liquid technology yields
a higher one period return and thus dominates the illiquid technology in the short run;therefore,
the bank will never choose the contract such that c1 >  holds.
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If the constraints do not bind we have the following rst order conditions
u0 (c1) = u
0

  c1 + (1  )Rh
1  

+ (1  )u0

  c1 + (1  )Rl
1  

(62)
 (Rh   1)u0

  c1 + (1  )Rh
1  

= (1  ) (1 Rl)u0

  c1 + (1  )Rl
1  

(63)
Looking at condition (63) it is possible to check that the assumption
Rh + (1  )Rl > 1
guarantees that  < 1: This condition can be interpreted as saying that the risky asset is
attractive enough to be optimal to invest in it. Moreover, in the absence of any information it is
desirable to continue the investment.
Solving the rst order conditions, we obtain
cSP1 =
1
+ (1  )

Rh 1
Rh Rl
  1

(1  )
1
 +

1 Rl
Rh Rl
  1


1


 (64)
SP =
Rh   cSP1 +

(Rh 1)
(1 )(1 Rl)
 1
  
cSP1  Rl

(Rh   1) +

(Rh 1)
(1 )(1 Rl)
 1

(1 Rl)
(65)
If Rl is high enough it maybe optimal to choose c1 = ; i.e. invest as much as possible in the
liquid asset. In this case the optimal contract would be given by

cSP1 ;

SP

; where
cSP1 =
1
+ (1  )  R1 h  + (1  )R1 l  1
and

SP
=

+ (1  )  R1 h  + (1  )R1 l  1
We will assume that Rl is su¢ ciently small to guarantee that the optimal choice is interior,
c1 < , otherwise the problem becomes too simple.
Proposition 1 The expected consumption of patient consumers is higher than the consumption
of the impatient.
Proof. See appendix at the end of this chapter.
Proposition 2 The optimal allocation involves liquidity risk sharing with a transfer of wealth
from patient to impatient agents.
Proof. See appendix at the end of this chapter..
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Example 4 This model is very similar with the literature that follows the Diamond and Dy-
bvigs (1983) work.22 As we will see later, if agents anticipate an outcome of R = Rl; they will
run to the bank in period 1. For this to make sense, we cannot have a low value of . Otherwise
bank runs would occur too often.
In order to illustrate the optimal contract we consider the following numerical example:
 = 0:25;  = 0:99;  = 2; Rh = 2; Rl = 0:1: The solution to the individuals problem with no
banks is, approximately, given by
 
cNB1 ; c
NB
2 (Rl) ; c
NB
2 (Rh) ; 
NB

= (0:73; 0:73; 1:30; 0:70)
While the application of the formulas given by (64) and (65) tells us that the optimal solution
is, approximately, given by
 
cSP1 ; c
SP
2 (Rl) ; c
SP
2 (Rh) ; 
SP

= (1:22; 0:17; 1:77; 0:37)
Therefore, the optimal solution under the social planner problem implies a lower investment
in the storage technology and, consequently, more investment in the more productive and risky
technology comparative with the individuals problem with no banks. It also implies risk sharing,
i.e. impatient consumers also benet from the high return of the illiquid technology being able
to have a larger consumption.
Finally, it should be noted, that in the economy with no banks the ex ante consumer welfare,
WNB =  0:92; is less than with banks, W SP =  0:669:
4.4 Incentive compatibility, signals and bank runs
Since each individuals type is private information, contracts cannot be made contingent on
depositors type. In this sense, it is important to verify if the optimal contract
 
cSP1 ; 
SP
1

; derived
in the previous subsection, can be supported as a Nash equilibrium if types are unobservable.
Putting in a di¤erent way, in this subsection we will check if patient agents have any incentive
to run when the other patients do not run under the optimal contract
 
cSP1 ; 
SP
1

.
Proposition 3 As long as depositors do not observe ; the contract
 
cSP1 ; 
SP

is incentive
compatible.
Proof. See appendix at the end of this chapter.
Proposition 3 tells us that the optimal solution is incentive compatible and hence it could be
supported as a Nash equilibrium, as long as no information about  becomes available in period 1.
Even the bad equilibria, the ones involving bank runs, could easily be avoided with a suspension
22For example, if  () = 1 for any , the setup of this model would basically be the same as Ennis and Keister
(2003).
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of convertibility scheme, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). For example, if the bank suspends
withdrawals in the rst period, after a proportion of  depositors are served, type 2 agents are
certain that the bank will never run out of resources and have no incentive to run. Under the
assumption that  is a known constant over time, as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) point out, a
simple suspension of convertibility policy is a costless way to eliminate the run equilibrium.
When agents do observe  the story changes completely. If  is such that  () = 1 type 2
agents will prefer to wait, as long as they expect the other type 2 agents to do the same. If
 () = 0 agents know that the bad state is about to occur and they will have an incentive to
run, even if the others do not run if
cSP1 >
SP   cSP1 +
 
1  SP Rl
1   (66)
Lemma 4 If the agents know  and  is such that  () = 0; then it is always optimal for type
2 agents to contact the bank in period 1.
Proof. Equation (66) simplies to cSP1 > 
SP+
 
1  SP Rl, which is trivial because proposition
2 implies that cSP1 > 1: Given that 
SP +
 
1  SP Rl is obviously smaller than one, the proof
is complete.
As it was dened in Chari and Jagannathan (1988), there will be some threshold, say ^, below
which type 2 agents prefer to make type 1 withdrawals. Hence for  < ^ it is always optimal to
run. Otherwise, if   ^ type 2 agents will not run, as long as they believe that the other patient
agents are doing the same. Suspension of convertibility would be su¢ cient to avoid bank runs
in this case, but if  < ^ this scheme is not enough to prevent it.
Since the probability of  < ^ is greater than zero, bank runs occur with a positive probability
and thus there is some positive probability that some agents end up with a zero consumption,
implying a minus innity utility. Therefore, the optimal period 1 consumption of the social
planner problem, cSP1 cannot be implemented as a competitive equilibrium.
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4.5 Bank runs and second best solutions
In the previous subsection, the rst best allocation would easily be implemented by the bank if
there were no available information about  in period 1. Once this assumption is relaxed, the
contract
 
cSP1 ; 
SP

implies that bank runs occur with positive probability. As result, this con-
tract is suboptimal because some agents will have consumption zero with a positive probability.
In this subsection we attempt do nd the optimal contract under two di¤erent arrangements:
suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance. With the rst mechanism, payments are sus-
pended at a certain level and with the second one, deposits are always guaranteed when the bank
fails.
4.5.1 Suspension of convertibility
We will assume a suspension of convertibility scheme in which the bank pays the same amount,
c1; to all early withdrawals until  agents have been served. At this point, the bank realizes
that there is a bank run and takes a conservative approach: the existing resources will be shared
among all the potential withdrawers. With this arrangement, after  agents are served the bank
will o¤er
  c1 + (1  )Rl
1  
to each individual who try to withdraw during the rst period. Patient agents will have guaran-
teed their period 2 consumption equal to
  c1 + (1  )Rl
1  
or
  c1 + (1  )Rh
1  
the early liquidation value of the risky assets is equal to the worse possible outcome. Type 2
agents who are not in the rst  agents to be served will prefer to wait until the second period.
Therefore, the partial suspension rules out sunspots or self-fullling prophecies.
Dene (1  ) as the probability of a bank run;  the probability of a good outcome in period
2, given that there was no bank run in period 1; and  the probability of a good outcome in
period 2 given that there is a run in period 1, the banks problem at t = 0 is given by
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max
;c1
W SC = 
n
u (c1) + (1  )
h
u

 c1+(1 )Rh
1 

+ (1  )u

 c1+(1 )Rl
1 
io
+ (1  )
n
u (c1) + (1  )
h
u

 c1+(1 )Rl
1 

+ (1  )

u

 c1+(1 )Rh
1 

+ (1  )u

 c1+(1 )Rl
1 
io
subject to
c1  
0    1
Since there is a probability of a bank run, the rst  agents receive a period 1 consumption equal
to c1; type 2 agents who decide to run but who are not in the rst fraction of agents, ; receive
  c1 + (1  )Rl
1   :
In the period 2, agents who decide not run will have8><>:
 c1+(1 )Rh
1  with probability 
 c1+(1 )Rl
1  with probability (1  )
if a good or a bad outcome occurs, respectively.
The banks problem simplies to
max
;c1
W SC = u (c1) + (1  )
h
( + (1  ) (1  ))u

 c1+(1 )Rh
1 

+ (1  ( + (1  ) (1  )))u   c1+(1 )Rl
1 

subject to
c1  
0    1
Let 0 =  + (1  ) (1  ); this is basically the same as the social planners problem in
subsection 4.2, with  replaced by 
0.
Assuming
0 (Rh   1)
(1  0) (1 Rl) > 1
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and Rl small enough, the constraints do not bind and we have
cSC1 =
1
+ (1  )

Rh 1
Rh Rl
  1

(1  0) 1 +

1 Rl
Rh Rl
  1

(0)
1

 (67)
SC =
Rh   cSC1 +

0(Rh 1)
(1 0)(1 Rl)
 1
  
cSC1  Rl

(Rh   1) +

0(Rh 1)
(1 0)(1 Rl)
 1

(1 Rl)
(68)
where
 
cSC1 ; 
SC
1

are the optimal allocation under the partial suspension arrangement.
Proposition 5 The optimal allocation involves liquidity risk sharing with a transfer of wealth
from patient to impatient agents.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of proposition 2.
Proposition 6 Period 1 consumption under suspension of convertibility scheme is less than
period 1 consumption of the social planners problem, i.e. cSC1  cSP1 :
Proof. See appendix.
The suspension of convertibility mechanism that we are considering implies that type 2 agents
behavior is independent of the actions of other individuals. In this sense, as we argued previously,
there is no room for self-fullling prophecies.
In period 1, let the realization of  be 1; when depositors observe 1; type 2 agents only have
to compare the utility of withdrawing in the rst period
u
 
cSC1

(69)
with the utility of waiting until period 2
 (1)u
 
SC   cSC1 +
 
1  SCRh
1  
!
+ (1   (1))u
 
SC   cSC1 +
 
1  SCRl
1  
!
(70)
If (69) is higher than the expected utility of waiting until period 2, i.e. (70), patient agents will
have an incentive to run. If the bank o¤ers cSC1 they will take it, however if it is o¤ered less, then
they prefer to wait for the second period. Therefore, there is a bank run if
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u
 
cSC1

>  (1)u

SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rh
(1 )

+ (1   (1))u

SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rl
(1 )

,
, (c
SC
1 )
1 
1  >  (1)
 
SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rh
(1 )
!1 
1  + (1   (1))
 
SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rl
(1 )
!1 
1  ,
,  (1) <
(cSC1 )
1  
 
SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rl
(1 )
!1 

SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rh
(1 )
1 
 

SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rl
(1 )
1 
:
Dene
SC 
 
cSC1
1    SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rl
(1 )
1 

SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rh
(1 )
1 
 

SC cSC1 +(1 SC)Rl
(1 )
1 
as the run threshold below which type 2 agents prefer to make type 1 withdrawals and, conse-
quently, upset the banks allocation scheme. If  () < SC there is a run; if  ()  SC no bank
runs will happen.
We are now in conditions to close the model. In period 0, when contracts are proposed the
probability of a bank run is equal to prob
 
 () < SC

and, thus, must be equal to (1  ) : In
this sense, we also dened the probability of a good outcome in period 2 given that there is a
run in period 1, ; as
E

 () j  () < SC
and the probability of a good outcome in period 2 given that there was no bank run in period 1,
; as
E

 () j  () > SC
Then ,  and  can be found by solving the implicit system of equations8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 = 1  prob   () < SC
 = E

 () j  () < SC
 = E

 () j  () > SC
(71)
Given that we not have degenerate probability distributions and that  () is continuous and
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strictly increasing, we must have that prob
 
 () < SC

E

 () j  () < SC
and
E

 () j  () > SC
are all strictly inside the unit interval, therefore we must have SC ; SC ; SC 2 (0; 1) :
Example 5 We will consider that  () = x; with x > 0: With the assumed specications, to
nd ;  and  we need to solve the system.8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 = 1   SC1=x
 = 
SC
x+1
 =
1 (SC)
x+1
x
(x+1)(1 (SC)1=x)
Letting  = ( + (1  ) (1  )) ; we have
cSC1 =
1
+ (1  ) (Rh  Rl)
1 


(Rh   1)
 1
 (1  ) 1 + (1 Rl)
 1
 
1


and
SC =
Rh   cSC1 +

(+(1 )(1 ))(Rh 1)
(1 (+(1 )(1 )))(1 Rl)
 1
  
cSC1  Rl

(Rh   1) +

(+(1 )(1 ))(Rh 1)
(1 (+(1 )(1 )))(1 Rl)
 1

(1 Rl)
Assuming that  = 2;  = 0:25; Rh = 2; Rl = 0:1 and  = 0:99:
The solution is 8><>:
 = 0:994045
 = 0:940068
 = 0:990299
and (
cSC1 = 1:217540
SC = 0:376415
:
The social welfare that corresponds to this solution is W SC =  0:675.
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4.5.2 Government deposit insurance
We will now assume that there exists government deposit insurance of the bank deposits at t = 2:
This insurance guarantees that whenever a bad outcome occurs, individuals will be covered by
the insurance fund and type 2 agents, who withdraw in period 2, will receive the same as if the
good outcome had occurred. This insurance removes the incentives of informed individuals to act
upon their information and hence to run on the bank. As a result, with deposit insurance, bank
runs will no longer occur and agents will consume what was planned in the ex ante contract.
Only type 1 agents who face liquidity needs will withdraw in period 1.
The banks problem under this arrangement is dened as
max
;c1
L = u (c1) + (1  )u

 c1+(1 )Rh
1 

subject to
c1  
 2 [0; 1]
Since the good outcome is guaranteed, the rst constraint will be binding, and the second
one is not: The problem simplies to
max
;c1
L = u (c1) + (1  )u

(1 )Rh
1 

where the optimal solution is given as8>>>><>>>>:
DI = 
+(1 )R
1 

h
cDI1 =
1
+(1 )R
1 

h
Freixas and Gabillon (1999) argued that deposit insurance had a cost for taxpayers. Samartín
(2002) said that the cost of deposit insurance is that when asset returns are low other sectors
have to be taxed to make up the shortfall. In this sense, we use the La¤ont and Tirole (1996)
approach to determine the welfare under this policy considering the social cost of the transfer
from the regulatory to the bank.
The welfare measure for deposit insurance will be the certain equivalent of the utility achieved
under the optimal contract minus the social cost of the expected transfer. Formally, it will be
WDI = L
 
DI ; cDI1
  (1 + g) (1  )  1  DI (Rh  Rl)
where the term (1  )
 
1  DI (Rh  Rl) is the expected transfer from the government to the
bank and its depositors. Since these costs have to be supported by the tax payers, the social
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costs of raising taxes have to be considered. In this sense, g can be interpreted as the deadweight
loss of the taxes.
4.6 Deposit insurance versus suspension of convertibility
Samartín (2002) showed, by numerical simulations, that the choice between deposit insurance
or suspension of convertibility may depend on exogenous parameters such as the level of risk
aversion, the agentsintertemporal discount factor and the attributes about the long-term asset
return. The author determined the variation of the critical deadweight tax (g) as a function
of the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient. This critical g is dened as the one for which the two
contracts - deposit insurance and suspension of convertibility - deliver the same utility. She
concluded that as the coe¢ cient of risk aversion increases the deposit insurance policy becomes
more attractive.
It is not denied that Samartíns result may be true for some particular values of risk aversion,
but in our model we conclude that if the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is above a certain value,
suspension of convertibility is always better than the deposit insurance contract. This result is
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 From an welfare point of view, if  is su¢ ciently high then suspension of convert-
ibility is better than deposit insurance as long as the deadweight loss of the taxes is nonnegative.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 8 If Rh is su¢ ciently high then suspension of convertibility is better than deposit
insurance, as long as the deadweight loss of the taxes is nonnegative.
Proof. See appendix.
Example 6 Although the rst of the above propositions seems to revert the result of Samartín
(2002), it is possible to replicate her results for small values of :
Consider x = 1=99;  = 2;  = 0:25; Rh = 2; Rl = 0:1. With these values the ex ante
probability of a bad outcome is 1%. Finding the optimal solutions one can conclude thatW SC =
 0:675: This value of g for which the two contracts  deposit insurance and suspension of
convertibility  deliver the same utility is g = 4:085:
If we increase the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to  = 4, we get that the new value
for g becomes g = 6:529; leading to the same conclusions of Samartín (2002), suggesting a
contradiction with our previous theorem.
However, this relation is not monotonic. If we consider even higher values for the relative
risk aversion coe¢ cient, this relation is reverted. For example, for  = 10 we get g = 3 and for
 = 40 we get g =  0:09:
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Samartín did not provide a general result, therefore we do not know if her conclusion would
hold for every value of the risk aversion coe¢ cient. In the model being considered here that is
denitely not true.
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4.7 Conclusion
In line with the work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we developed a model assuming a contin-
uum number of agents, random preferences over consumption scheme and private information
about agents type. The bank can improve on a competitive market by issuing demand de-
posits contracts, which allow for better risk sharing among consumers. However, we introduce a
new assumption which is not familiar to the self-fullling prophecies literature: agents observe a
macroeconomic indicator which gives them information about the outcome in period 2. It should
be noted that the information provided by this indicator is imperfect. Therefore, our model is
developed both in the traditions of sunspots and information-based runs.
The optimal solution under the social planner problem, implies a lower investment in the
storage technology comparative to the individuals problem with no bank. As result, impatient
consumers benet from the high return of the illiquid technology being able to have a larger con-
sumption. As expected the economy with no bank the ex ante consumer welfare is less than in the
economy with banks. Additionally, under the assumption that the fraction of impatient agents
is known and that no macroeconomic signal is observed, a simple suspension of convertibility
policy is a costless way to eliminate the bad equilibria, the ones involving bank runs.
However, once we consider that agents observe a macroeconomic indicator, the optimal solu-
tion in the social planner problem is no longer incentive compatible. We used our model to test
the e¤ect of two di¤erent policies that aim to mitigate to probability of a bank run: (partial)
suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance.
In our framework, we showed that if the level of risk aversion is high enough, suspension of
convertibility dominates deposit insurance, contradicting some of the previous literature. How-
ever, we were able to reconcile our results with Samartín (2002) because we showed, numerically,
that the relation is not monotone for low values of risk aversion. Nevertheless, as in Peck and
Shell (2003), we conclude that is possible to have an equilibrium bank run, because in our model
(information based) runs occur with a positive probability under the suspension of convertibility
arrangement.
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4.8 Appendix of the chapter
A1: proof of proposition 1
One of the rst order conditions is
u0 (c1) = u
0

 c1+(1 )Rh
1 

+ (1  )u0

 c1+(1 )Rl
1 

,
u0 (c1) = E
 
u
0
(c2)

Given that the marginal utility is a convex function, Jensens inequality guarantees the desired
result. The proof is complete.
A2: proof of proposition 2
Without liquidity risk sharing the highest consumption that a impatient agent can achieve is
one. Therefore, we only need to prove that cSP1 > 1; which is the same as showing that
1 >  + (1  ) (Rh  Rl)
1 


(Rh   1)1 
1
 (1  )
1
 + (1 Rl)1 
1
 
1



,
, (Rh  Rl)
 1
  

(Rh   1)1 
1
 (1  )
1
 + (1 Rl)1 
1
 
1



> 0
Dene
g (Rl) = (Rh  Rl)
 1
  

(Rh   1)1 
1
 (1  )
1
 + (1 Rl)1 
1
 
1



if we prove that @g(Rl)
@Rl
> 0, we will only need to show that g (0)  0: Note that
@g (Rl)
@Rl
=
(   1)
 (1 Rl)

(Rh  Rl) 
1
 (Rl   1) + (1 Rl)
 1+
 
1



and @g(Rl)
@Rl
> 0; which implies that
(1 Rl)
1
 < ((Rh  Rl) )
1
 ,
, Rh + (1  )Rl > 1
which is true by assumption. To complete the proof we need to show that g (0)  0, which is
equivalent to
R
 1

h  (Rh   1)
 1
 (1  )
1
 + 
1


The right hand side is maximized for  =
1
Rh
and for that value both sides are equal. The proof
is complete.
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A3: proof of proposition 3
As long as agents do not observe  they do not revise their expectations about the probability
of a good outcome. If the other patient agents do not run, there is no incentive for a patient
agent to run if
u

SP cSP1 +(1 SP )Rh
(1 )

+ (1  )u

SP cSP1 +(1 SP )Rl
(1 )

> u
 
cSP1
 ,
, 
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cSP1 +(1 SP )Rh
(1 )
!1 
1  + (1  )
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cSP1 +(1 SP )Rl
(1 )
!1 
1  >
(cSP1 )
1 
1 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, 

SP 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(1 )cSP1
1 
+ (1  )

SP cSP1 +(1 SP )Rl
(1 )cSP1
1 
< 1
Introducing the SP , this is the same as

(1 cSP1 )
(1 )cSP1
1    1 (Rh 1) 1  +(1 ) 1 (1 Rl) 1  !(Rh Rl)1  
(Rh 1)(1 )
1
 (1 Rl)
1
 +(1 Rl)
1

 (Rh 1)
1

!1  < 1
Using the result for cSP1 and after some messy, but straightforward algebra, we get
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1
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1
 (1 Rl)
1

1  
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 
1



This last inequality was proved before. The proof is complete.
A4: proof of proposition 6
We need to show that cSC1 < c
SP
1 and, comparing the formulas, it is immediate that this is the
same as showing
(Rh   1)1 
1
 (1  0) 1 + (1 Rl)1 
1
 (0)
1
 > (Rh   1)1 
1
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1
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1
 
1


which simplies to
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
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0) 1   (1  )
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Since by assumption
0 (Rh   1)
(1  0) (1 Rl) > 1,
(Rh   1)
(1 Rl) >
1  0
0
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we only need to prove that

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0
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Using 0 = ( + (1  ) (1  )) ; we get
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which is equivalent to
1  (1   ( +   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  1))  1 (1  )
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 + ( (   + ) +  (1  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 1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1


It is easy to check that the value of  that strictly maximizes the right hand side is
 =
   + 
   + 
For that value the right hand side is identical to 1, and thus the inequality must be satised for
any value of  2 (0; 1). The proof is complete.
A5: proof of proposition 7
Wewill determine the value of g for which the two contracts - deposit insurance and suspension
of convertibility - yield the same welfare. Then, we will prove that as  !1; g becomes negative
and, hence, suspension of convertibility yields a higher welfare.
W SC = WDI
,
g =
L
 
DI ; cDI1
 W SC
(1  )
 
1  DI (Rh  Rl)   1
With deposit insurance
lim
!1+
cDI1 =
1
+ (1  ) 1
Rh
and
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 
1  DIRh
1   =
1
+ (1  ) 1
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Then
L
 
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
=

1
+(1 ) 1
Rh
1 
1  
and
lim
!1+
L
 
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
= 0
With suspension of convertibility
lim
!1+
cSCc1 = lim
!1+
SC = 1
Thus, consumption is one in every period and
lim
!1+
W SC = 0
Finally, we conclude that
lim
!1+
g =  1
The proof is complete.
A6: proof of proposition 8
Note that as Rh increases L
 
DI ; cDI1

and W SC also increases. But L
 
DI ; cDI1

and W SC
are bounded above by zero and hence L
 
DI ; cDI1
  W PS will never diverge to innity, and so
we only need to show that as Rh increases,
 
1  DI (Rh  Rl)!1 to conclude that g !  1
(see previous proof). But
 
1  DI (Rh  Rl) =
0@1  
+ (1  )R
1 

h
1A (Rh  Rl) = (1  ) (Rh  Rl)
and the result follows. The proof is complete.
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5 Conclusion
Banco Portugues de Negocios (BPN) was nationalized in November 2008, the rst bank nation-
alization in Portugal since 1975. At the time of nationalization, BPN had lost an estimated e700
million from declining investment values from the global nancial crisis and had negative capital
of approximately e1.9 billion. in U.S. Department of State23
While in some industrial countries the role of banking in the economy is declining, banks con-
tinue to dominate the nancial systems of developing and transition countries.24 Banks provide
important positive externalities as gatherers of savings, allocators of resources and providers of
liquidity and payment services. They are particularly subject to market failures arising from
asymmetries of information. On the asset side they take on the risk of valuing projects and fund-
ing borrowers whose ability to repay is uncertain. On the liability side, the condence of creditors
and depositors, who have imperfect information on the banks actual position, is essential to a
banks ability to provide deposit and payment services.
In Diamond and Dybvigs (1983) model, the bank provides liquidity to depositors who are ex
ante uncertain about their preferences over consumption schemes. The demand deposit contracts
support a pareto-optimal allocation of the risk by allowing depositors to make early withdrawals
when they need most. Nevertheless a second and ine¢ cient equilibrium exists in which depositors
panic and withdraw their deposits immediately. Demand deposit contracts provide liquidity but
leave banks vulnerable to runs. Allocations resulted by an equilibrium bank run are worse than
those which would be obtained without bank. Despite that, the authors pointed out that even
when depositors anticipate that a banking panic may occur, they will deposit at least some part
of their wealth in the bank, as long as they believe that the probability of a run is su¢ ciently
small.
The model presented in this master thesis is built on both sunspots and business cycle view
of origins and causes of bank runs. As in the standard of literature preferences over consumption
schemes are random, information about agents type is private and the bank behaves competi-
tively. It is assumed the existence of a continuum of ex ante identical agents of measure one who
observe a macroeconomic indicator, which gives them information about the outcome in the last
period. Contrary to the literature, we assume that the information provided by this indicator is
imperfect.
The bank can hold a portfolio consisting both in the safe and risky assets, providing a
insurance to consumers against their uncertain liquidity demands. In the rst period individuals
deposit their funds in the bank to take advantage of this expertise. Since it is assumed that the
banking sector is competitive, the bank o¤ers risk-sharing contracts that maximize depositors
ex ante expected utility. Under this setup, impatient agents have a large consumer compare to
23http://www.state.gov/
24See Lindgren et all (1996).
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the allocation under autarky. Thus, consumers have a higher benet in an economy with banks.
When depositors types are observable, and hence contracts can be made contingent on the
depositors type, the rst-best allocation will obtain. Since each individuals type is private, the
optimal solution will still be incentive compatible as long as no information about the macroeco-
nomic indicator becomes available in period 1. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), even the bad
equilibria (the ones involving bank runs) could easily be avoided with a suspension of convertibil-
ity scheme. However, everything is di¤erent when agents observe the macroeconomic indicator.
In this case, in common with Chari and Jagannathan (1988), there is a threshold below which
type 2 agents prefer to make type 1 withdrawals. In general, their decisions may also depend
on what they believe other patient agents are doing. Bank runs occur with positive probability
which implies that some agents end up with zero consumption.
The main motivation of the work developed in this master thesis is to compare, from an
welfare point of view, two di¤erent banking regulations that try to avoid or mitigate the e¤ects
of bank runs - suspension of convertibility and government deposit insurance. We were able to
prove that if the level of risk aversion is high enough, suspension of convertibility dominates
deposit insurance, but the relation is not monotone for low values of risk aversion. This seems
contradict some of the previous literature. Samartín (2002) concluded that as the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion increases, the cuto¤ value of deadweight tax also increases and so the deposit
insurance arrangement is best for a larger set of parameters. Nevertheless, as in Peck and Shell
(2003), we conclude that is possible to have an equilibrium bank run, because in our model
(information based) runs occur with a positive probability under the suspension of convertibility
arrangement.
Finally, we also concluded that government deposit insurance removes the incentives of in-
formed individuals to act upon their information and hence to run on the bank. Under this
policy, bank runs will no longer occur and agents will consume what was planned in the ex ante
contract. Only type 1 agents who face liquidity needs will withdraw in period 1.
While such program has often proven e¤ective in preventing runs, it has signicant short-
comings. Ennis and Keister (2009) noted that a credible deposit insurance requires that the
government be able to guarantee the real value of deposits in the event of a widespread runs,
which is not always feasible, and generates moral hazard. Cooper and Ross (2002) extend the
Diamond and Dybvigs (1983) model to evaluate the cost and benets of deposit insurance in
the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. They showed that the
government choose to o¤er only partial deposit insurance in order to mitigate the moral haz-
ard problem, and that this partial insurance can be insu¢ cient to rule out a self-fullling run.
The run on UK bank Northern Rock in 2007 clearly highlights the limitations of partial deposit
insurance schemes. This address interesting questions to future research work.
The recent nancial turmoil has revived the debate concerning government responsibility in
crises managements. In this sense, another interesting point to future work is to analyze, from an
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welfare point of view, government policies in particular taxpayers money to recapitalize banks,
government injection of money into the banking system though credit lines and taxes on nancial
transactions (the Tobin tax). Portugal is one of the Euro zone countries that is considering to
implement in 2013 the Tobin tax.
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